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I. Introduction
A subject of much concern in recent years has been the re-
surgent tendency among developed nations to adopt sectoral po-
licies designed to protect aging domestic industries from foreign
competition. The decision taken by the West German government in
late 1983 to step up its subsidies to the iron and steel industry
is yet another example of this general protectionistic trend.
Seen through the lens of standard trade theory, using the bench-
mark assumptions of full wage and price flexibility, this devel-
opment appears quite paradoxical; the central message of that
theory being, of course, that everyone could be made better off
by adhering to the principles of free trade and specializing in
what each does best. Once the full flexibility assumptions are
relaxed, however, and also more attention is paid to the distri-
butional consequences of changed economic conditions, the norma-
tive message of traditional trade theory becomes less compelling
and the attempts by governments to interfere in the economy more
understandable. Various frictions and market imperfections have
the effect (that the adaptation to altered circumstances entails
considerable costs and hardships. Moreover, these adjustment
costs and the eventual benefits accruing from a more efficient
resource allocation tend not to be equally borne and received by
all members of a society. Governments generally lack the instru-
ments and information to effect the compensating transfers from
gainers to losers, such that the structural readjustments re-
quired in a free market would be found acceptable by all. So it
is not surprising that those adversely affected members would be
reluctant to make those adjustments, and would, instead, demand
government policies that protect their particular interests. In
representative democracies, such demands are likely to elicit
some supply response from politicians in the market for protec-
tion. Under these circumstances, a positive analysis of the poli-- 2 -
tical market for public intervention would be called for in order
to understand why nations have chosen to adopt particular sec-
toral policies; what underlying objectives these policies are
meant to satisfy. Having understood those objectives, it then
falls within the realm of normative analysis to ask whether the
policies actually adopted are the best available means of achiev-
ing them.
The position advanced in this essay is that sectoral subsi-
dies are an inadequate means of combatting the problems which
have arisen in Germany on account of the depressed steel in-
dustry. Regarding the objectives of the recent German steel sub-
sidy program, we believe that this was intended mainly as a tem-
porary measure to ease the adjustment burdens of unskilled work-
ers, by maintaining stable employment levels in the regions where
the steel industry is heavily concentrated. Our focus of criti-
cism here lies on the misdirected use of sectoral policies to
attain a regional objective. These subsidy measures achieve their
employment goal largely by preventing the structural adjustments
required by changed conditions in the world steel market, rather
than facilitating the structural transition. As a result, once
these subsidies are phased out, as intended, and market forces
are allowed freer sway over the economy, the same readjustment
burdens will reappear, along with the associated costs that trig-
gered the initial round of subsidies. The same political forces
would therefore be set in motion again which had succeeded in
obtaining steel subsidies in the first place. Such a pattern, if
continued, would lead to a gradual ossification of Germany's in-
dustrial structure.
A preferable alternative, suggested below, would be to adopt
a regionally oriented wage subsidy program. This would have the
effect of keeping regional employment levels stable, but without
the same impediments to required structural readjustments as are
provided by the sectoral measures. Also, this policy would be
more compatible with a gradual phasing down of subsidies over
time. That is not to say, however, that regional wage subsidies
are the first-best measure conceivable in a world unconstrained- 3 -
by political realities. They do have the drawback that mobile
factor resources remain absorbed in regions which are location-
ally disadvantageous for producing a given set of commodities,
relative to other regions. Our claim is simply that this is a
smaller price to pay for attaining certain politically determined
objectives, independent of whether those objectives are con-
sidered desirable or not.
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the possible
economic consequences of the recent German steel subsidy program
and assess to what extent those consequences conform with the
objectives which motivated that program's adoption. The paper is
organized as follows: Particular developments in the steel in-
dustry are briefly described in section II, while in section III,
the political economy of protection in Germany is examined to
determine the primary beneficiaries of previous protectionist
policies. Both serve as a basis for identifying the revealed
political objectives behind the current steel program. The next
step is to simulate the economic consequences of a decline in the
world market price of steel in the absence of any government
intervention, using a multi-sectoral general equilibrium model of
an open economy that resembles Germany. The economic impacts of a
sectoral policy response and a regional policy response are then
likewise examined and compared. This occurs in section V. The
main elements and assumptions of the model used are outlined in
section IV; the complete model specification is presented in an
appendix. Conclusions are drawn in section VI.
II. Crisis in the Steel Industry
The well-publicized hardships currently confronting the iron
and steel industries in North America and Western Europe did not
appear overnight and there is also little hope that they will
soon disappear. Once regarded as the shining flagships of indus-
trial prosperity, these industries have in recent years acquired
the dull patina of senescent dreadnoughts barely able to remain
afloat. Since 1974, which marks the last major steel boom, the- 4 -
general economic picture in this sector has been dismal; declin-
ing production, continuing layoffs, extreme levels of capital
underutilization and high operating losses are typically ob-
served . Partly, these difficulties can be traced to the cyclical
decline in demand resulting from the worldwide stagnation in
economic activity over most of the 1970s. However, the more im-
portant and lasting threat to the survival of these industries is
attributable to the increasing labor and locational cost disad-
vantages vis-a-vis producers in Japan and the newly industria-
lized countries such as Brazil, Mexico and South Korea (Dicke
(1983), Walter (1982), Wolter (1977)).
As conditions worsened for the iron and steel industry, the
demands for protection intensified. While various rounds of nego-
tiations under the auspices of the GATT had largely succeeded in
removing the tariff instrument from the national armories of
protective weapons, governments were quick to respond with a new
array of sophisticated measures. Beginning in 1968, when the
United States first succeeded in pressuring foreign (mainly Ja-
panese) suppliers into accepting Voluntary Export Restraints,
there soon followed import quotas and trigger price mechanisms
coupled with threats of anti-dumping suits. Members of the Euro-
pean Community soon responded with their own brands of similar
arrangements; negotiating voluntary export restraints, then in-
stalling minimum price and mandatory production quotas, coordi-
nated through the Eurofer cartel which was formally established
in 1976. Exciting narratives of this escalating trade war are
provided in Jones (1983) and Walter (1979). In spite of each
measure taken, the competitive pressures from abroad did not
abate for long, as each country responded to its competitors
1
policies in a protectionistic carrousel. In the European Com-
In Germany, which accounts for about one-third of steel
produced in the EC, crude steel production declined from 53
millon tons in 1974 to 36 million tons in 1982. The capacity
utilization ratio meanwhile declined from 87% to around 60%.
Registered employment in the iron and steel industry fell over
this period from 174 thousand to 126 thousand workers
(Iron and Steel Yearbook).- 5 -
munity, this sheltering process increasingly led to the adoption
of direct subsidies, continuing to the point where most of these
2
industries are now nationalized . In this respect, Germany has
provided the exception, with most of its steel industry still in
private hands.
While the German steel industry has not been exempt from the
difficulties mentioned, it has generally been able to survive
until now without the massive infusions of government subsidies
received by its EC neighbors. Until very recently, only the Arbed
Saarstahl company in Germany received any significant direct aid;
amounting to approximately three billion DM between 1978 and 1983
with another one billion DM scheduled until 1985. However, in
1983 an additional three billion DM in subsidies were alloted
toward steel, to be paid out over the period 1984-85 . Although
these figures are still small in comparison to those granted the
steel industries in the rest of the EC (estimated around 66 bil-
lion DM between 1980-85), they signal an increased government
4 involvement in the German steel industry .
2
With tariffs no longer a viable alternative, the increasing
emphasis placed on subsidies as a means of stemming the decline
of the iron and steel industries is not surprising. Steelmaking
involves easily available, relative standardized techniques,
and the main bulk of products falling under this category are
fairly homogenous and freely traded internationally. As Jones
(1979) points out, these characteristics make attempts to car-
telize the industry over any significant period (as intended by
the EC's Davignon Plan) extremely difficult. Similarly, experi-
ence has shown that selective quotas and bilateral export re-
straint agreements quickly tend to develop into bureaucratic
nightmares and are frequently circumvented unless those mea-
sures can be applied comprehensively against all outside sup-
pliers; see e.g. Canto, Eastin and Laffer (1982). The last
recourse, then, for nations intent on propping up their falter-
ing industries is to grant subsidies.
The financial burden is to be carried by the federal and state
governments in a 2/3 to 1/3 proportion.
4
Interestingly enough, the decision to step up subsidies occur-
red after the Christian Democratic Party replaced the Social
Democrats in national office (late 1982) on a platform of less
public interference, which seems to indicate that protectionist
responses in Germany are largely independent of party lines.- 6 -
The decision to subsidize German steel was taken in concert
with other EC members through the offices of the EC Commission.
Under the guidelines set up by this commission, member countries
are to terminate subsidization by the end of 1985 . During the
negotiations which led to this agreement, the problem of over-
capacity in steelmaking existing in Europe became explicitly
recognized. The current subsidy measures were therefore intended
as a temporary program to facilitate an orderly adjustment toward
reduced levels of operation . However, there are strong reasons
to doubt that these subsidy programs will be soon dismantled.
Among them is the inertial tendency, observed often enough in
previous policies adopted toward other sectors, for programs to
persist once they have been installed. Also, there are already
signs that some EC members are not prepared to abide by the 1985
subsidy termination date agreed to previously . The defection of
some members from the agreement will therefore make it easier for
others to defend their violation of the same. Most important,
however, we feel is the fact that the final objectives which
these temporary subsidies were intended to fulfill, will not
continue to be satisfied once the subsidies are removed. That is
the central conclusion to emerge from the analytic experiments
later on. Therefore, unless the political configuration of pres-
sure groups which succeeded in obtaining subsidies in the first
place is drastically altered, there is little ground for hope
that they will not succeed again.
Judging from various past and recent pronouncements by go-
vernment spokesmen, the preservation of a German steel industry
The German government has been a persistent force behind the
multilateral elimination of subsidies within the EC, with the
support of spokesmen from the iron and steel industry; another
reflection, perhaps, of the relatively strong competitive posi-
tion of German steelmakers vis-^-vis its European neighbors.
See, for example, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregie-
rung, Stand der Stahlpolitik (7 Februrary 1984) .
France, for example, has unilaterally decided to give an addi-
tional 30 billion FF in fresh subsidies to its steel industry
between 1984 and 1987 in violation of the EC Code (Financial
Times, 6 April 1984).- 7 -
does not appear to be a primary policy objective. In the words of
one government insider, Gerhard Ollig (1980) , "The basic economic
organization of the Federal Republic of Germany is such that
there is no special policy for steel;...". Instead; "Many of the
measures taken to aid reconversion [in parts of the steel indus-
try] are social ones, taken primarily to alleviate the plight of
the workers affected..." (pg. 530). Were the existence of a do-
mestic steel industry to constitute a national objective (possib-
ly to ensure self-sufficiency for strategic purposes), or to be
regarded as an important symbol of prestige (as some countries
view their nationalized airlines), then the adoption of sectoral
measures might be more defensible. However, the underlying social
goal behind these measures in Germany is a different one, and
before we can judge the effectiveness of sectoral measures in
meeting that target, it is first necessary to find out what that
target may be.
III. The Determinants of Sectoral Protection in Germany
The general question of why polities often seek to protect
ailing traditional industries has been a central focus of the
rapidly expanding literature on the "international political
economy of protection" (see e.g., Bhagwati (1982) and Frey
(1984)). The public choice approach which underlies this lite-
rature views government policies as determined in a market for
rents or public protection. One aim is to identify the separate
actors competing in that market and their economic objectives. An
early step in this thematic direction was taken by Stolper and
Samuelson (1941), who show in the context of a standard 2x2
Heckscher-Ohlin model that the factor used intensively in the
protected sector gains at the expense of the other factor. This
conclusion suggests that views on protection would be divided
along factor lines. However, subsequent work (Magee; 1978) has
indicated that views on protection are divided along industry
lines, with both factors within an industry usually espousing the
same position. To generate incentive patterns leading to this
behavior, attention has shifted away from the "long-run" Heck-- 8 -
scher-Ohlin model toward other models. Magee (1978) himself, for
example, resuscitates Cairnes
1 (1874) model as one extreme, which
assumes all factors to be industry—specific in both the short-
and long-run. Within that model, increased sectoral protection
would benefit all factors employed in the sheltered industry.
Mayer (1974), Mussa (1974) and Neary (1978) , on the other hand,
only assume capital to be fixed in the short-run within each
sector while labor is mobile intersectorally, and Baldwin (1984)
introduces sector-specific skills which take time to acquire by
workers. The common ground emphasized in all of these approaches
is that some form of factor immobility is necessary (at least in
the short-run) in order to replicate key aspects of actually
g
observed protection-seeking behavior . Less mobility is simply
another way of stating that the opportunity costs to factor
owners of moving to different industries or occupations are
greater, and so the incentive to retain the rents collected in
the present employment situation is commensurately higher.
The theoretical models reviewed so far consider only capital
and labor as distinct entities, each of which may or may not be
bound sectorally. Several empirical studies on patterns of pro-
tection, however, suggest that, at least for Germany, an addi-
tional dimension be considered; namely that a distinction be
drawn between skilled and unskilled labor. Anderson and Baldwin
(1981) thus summarize the evidence obtained from various inde-
pendent econometric studies on the determinants of protection in
nine developed countries: "The results ... suggest that it is the
The proposition, that lack of mobility and active political
participation are positively correlated, also draws support
from the more traditional political science literature. For
example, in reference to behavior patterns in developing coun-
tries, Huntington and. Nelson (1976) write: "For the individual,
political participation... is a means to an end, and that end
is usually some form of improvement in his social and economic
status. The individual also generally sees his own efforts at
socioeconomic mobility - through migration, education, or job
betterment - as more effective, more direct, less costly, and
less risky routes to his goal than collective political action.
Only if mobility is blocked does he turn to organization. His
involvement in politics usually occurs when he sees no alter-
native to it." (pg. 113).- 9 -
low-wage, labor intensive, low value-added, declining industries
facing strong and growing import competition that are receiving
the greatest boost over time or the least cuts in multilateral
tariff-cutting concessions ..." (pg. 20). With particular refer-
ence to Germany, Glismann and Weiss (1980) arrive at similar
results. In view of the particular institutional aid-granting
framework existing in Germany, their study distinguishes between
government aid channeled through regional development programs
and non-regional project or industry-specific assistance, each
accounting for about half of the total aid granted. They find, by
way of cross-sectional analyses, that the number of employees in
an industry is significantly (positively) correlated with at
least the non-regional component of total domestic assistance to
German manufacturing industries. On the other hand, human capital
and physical capital intensity do not appear to exert a signifi-
cant influence on domestic aid to industries, either total or
non-regional. Riedel (1977) obtains support in Germany for the
hypothesis, originally advanced by Cheh (1974), that changes in
effective protection reflect a governmental policy of minimizing
labor adjustment problems. He finds the reductions in effective
protection barriers across various industries, between 1964 and
1972, to be significantly negatively related to industry employ-
ment, but significantly positively related to human capital (a
measure obtained in part by comparing an industry's average wage
to the unskilled wage). That would indicate that not all workers
are the focus of protection, but rather the less skilled, lower
q
paid workers . This proposition is also advanced by Constanto-
9
For the United States, Cheh (1974) had also found industry
employment to be a significant variable in explaining tariff
changes. However, in contrast to Riedel's results, the percen-
tage of unskilled workers in the industry did not emerge signi-
ficantly, indicating that perhaps unskilled workers in the U.S.
are not as politically active relative to other groups in pur-
suing their interests, as in Germany. Nie, Powell and Prewitt
(1969) corroborate this conjecture. They note that in general
there is a tendency for people with higher education, income
and occupational status to be more involved in political ac-
tivity than people with less of these attributes. In correlat-
ing measures of social status and organizational involvement in
several countries, however, they obtain a coefficient value of
.435 for the United States and only a value of .213 for Ger-
many.- 10 -
poulos (1974) in her investigation of tariff structures in five
West European countries, including Germany, prior to the estab-
lishment of common tariffs by the EC. Her conjecture, that ta-
riffs protect the wage of unskilled workers rather than labor
income in general, is supported by the stronger correlation ob-
tained for most countries (except France) between the height of
nominal tariffs and indices of unskilled labor intensiveness
across industries, as opposed to total labor intensiveness
According to the earlier line of reasoning, barriers to
mobility are an essential element in the formation of protec-
tionist pressures. In drawing a distinction between skilled and
unskilled labor, it is therefore natural that we examine the
mobility characteristics of each. In a comprehensive study spon-
sored by the German Labor Ministry, Siegel, Stevens and Werth
(1976) analyze various aspects of labor mobility in member coun-
tries of the European Community. With respect to the German labor
market, they observe that workers with high levels of formal
education and highly placed in terms of social and occupational
status (all of which are highly correlated among themselves) are
considerably more geographically mobile than are workers at the
other end of the scale. At the same time, these same higher qua-
lified workers are considerably less mobile occupationally than
are the lower qualified workers . These results suggest the fol-
lowing stereotypic pattern: skilled workers are regionally mobile
and sectorally immobile, and conversely, unskilled workers are
sectorally mobile but regionally immobile.
Most of the studies reviewed also point toward a positive re-
lation between protection and increasing import penetration or
declining industrial health, suggesting that the incentive to
prevent a deterioration in one's economic position, through
political channels, is stronger than to use those channels as
a vehicle for improvement. That may explain the (apparently
paradoxical) willingness, in Germany, to attract large numbers
of unskilled immigrant workers during the booming sixties.
Predictably, this enthusiasm has waned in recent years with
the slowdown in economic growth.
Some additional figures on mobility and occupational/educa-
tional status in Germany, which strongly support these find-
ings, are contained in Quintessenzen; Berufswege und Arbeits-
markt (1976) .- 11 -
This behavioral pattern can be easily explained from an
economic perspective: To the extent that skills represent sec-
tor-specific human capital, as emphasized in Baldwin (1984), the
owner of skills incurs a capital loss by moving from one sector
to another. So, the opportunity costs of transferring to a dif-
ferent sector increase with the amount of human capital acquired,
relative to the psychic and pecuniary costs involved in shifting
12 geographic locations . Hence, a less qualified worker is more
likely to find that regional migration costs outweigh the sec-
toral relocation costs reflected in changed earnings. Conse-
quently, we would expect to find the market for unskilled labor
to be segmented more along regional lines, the market for skilled
labor along sectoral lines. These lines would increasingly over-
lap the higher is the regional concentration of the different
sectors. In this respect, it is interesting to note the wide, and
much commented, disparity of unemployment rates across states in
Germany; for example, the average annual unemployment rates re-
corded for the Saarland since 1971 have consistently been twice
as high as the levels recorded for the nearby state of Baden-
Wurttemberg.
The empirical studies discussed earlier have indicated that
industry protection in Germany (and in developed countries ge-
nerally) largely protects the interests of unskilled labor. How-
ever, as these studies are based on single-equation estimation
techniques, an identification problem exists: It is not possible
to distinguish the demand and supply effects which have led to
this particular outcome in the market for protection. So far, we
have only considered the demand side, arguing that it is mainly
regional mobility costs which prompt unskilled workers to seek
protection in response to adverse economic developments. On the
supply side, the argument is frequently voiced that labor re-
12
Regarding regional relocation costs, the role of housing and
rent regulations are not to be underestimated in Germany's
particular case. With ceilings placed on the rate of rent in-
crease after a tenant has moved in, length of tenure of an
apartment is tantamount to accumulated capital which is lost by
moving.- 12 -
ceives the most protection because it has the most votes. The
particular concern for unskilled labor then tends to be explained
by "subjective" reasons, which cause politicians (and a philan-
tropic-minded society) to be especially sensitive to the con-
ditions of these generally poorer members of society. Measures
which safeguard their welfare are defended on grounds of social
justice or, not quite so altruistically, to prevent possible so-
cial unrest. However, there is another motive for a strong re-
sponsiveness by politicians to unskilled labor interests in par-
liamentary democracies which is directly related to the fact that
these workers tend to be regionally immobile. This is that voting
districts are geographic demarcations, and therefore the re-
gionally immobile factors would constitute the most stable com-
ponent of a politician's constituency base. While higher skilled
workers are more likely to exit into other voting districts in
response to better opportunities or adverse conditions, less
mobile unskilled workers would be more inclined to exit politi-
cians if their demands are not met. Insofar as politicians' for-
tunes depend on regional power bases, there is therefore a good
incentive to placate those demands. On the other hand, there is
also an incentive for each politician to discourage the outflow
of constituents from his district, since that may lead to an
erosion of his influence within parliament (to the extent of
complete elimination, should two voting districts be merged).
Because elections generally occur more often than the redesign of
district boundaries, however, this second incentive is likely to
be less critical than the first. Nonetheless,it does suggest a
greater inclination to offer policies which benefit unskilled
labor by raising demands for those workers in the areas where
they happen to be located (such as the sectoral or regionally-
focused subsidies discussed in this paper), rather than policies
which would facilitate the movement of unskilled workers into
other more productive geographic regions, by reducing mobility
costs.
In summary, the evidence and arguments advanced here indi-
cate that a primary motivation behind industry protection in
Germany is the protection of interests of unskilled labor. Sincetolotlsek dee Ii
lait&to!
- 13 -
the steel industry is highly regionally concentrated, and because
of the regional immobility of unskilled labor, adverse develop-
ments in the iron and steel sector are likely to have an unequal
regional impact on employment or wages. Our purpose, then, in the
remaining sections is to assess at what cost a sector-specific,
steel subsidy is able to solve what turns out to be, in effect, a
regional labor market problem.
IV. A General Equilibrium Model of Germany
To analyze the questions raised earlier, we have constructed
a general equilibrium model of an open economy, emphasizing the
real sector, with parameter values chosen to reflect the West
German economy. The general theoretical structure which underlies
this analytic framework is the multi-sector, general equilibrium
ORANI model system developed by Dixon et al. (1982) , which in
turn has its origin in Johansen (1960) . One distinguishing cha-
racteristic of the ORANI-class models is the fairly firm rooting
in conventional microeconomic theory: Producers minimize costs
subject to certain technology constraints and prices, while con-
sumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Another
trait is the detailed attention devoted to intersectoral linka-
ges; input-output tables provide the structural backbone of the
model.
In this model, we consider the West German economy as con-
sisting of two regions (I and II), where each region is disag-
gregated into ten producing sectors. In effect, we may think of
these regions as two countries having extremely close economic
ties, trading with the rest of the world. The two regions differ
only with respect to the proportions in which the ten sectors are
represented in each; with Region I containing a relatively high
concentration of iron and steel industries and also of coal in-
dustries. Their joint concentration is not surprising in view of
the close production linkages between both sectors. In more con-
crete terms, and in view of the fact that accessible regional
data was primarily available only at the state (LSnder) level,- 14 -
what we have done is to give Region I a sectoral structure that
reflects the industrial composition of North Rhine-Westfalia and
the Saarland, while Region II comprises the remaining 6 German
states and 3 city-states. North Rhine-Westfalia and the Saarland
combined account for about 59% of the total value of iron and
steel produced in Germany and for about 86% of total coal pro-
duction, while producing 29% of Germany's GDP.
The commodities produced by the ten sectors in both regions
consist of nine traded goods, one of which is, of course, iron
and steel, and a non-traded good, which includes all government
services. The sectoral classification employed here is based on
an aggregation of the 58-industries input-output table provided
by the German Statistisches Bundesamt and is explained in Appen-
dix A. We assume that the technology employed in each sector is
the same across regions. Also each sector produces an identical
good in both regions and, except for the non-traded good, there
are no commodity trade barriers between both regions, so that the
law-of-one-price obtains. On the other hand, domestically pro-
duced goods and similarly classified goods produced in the rest
of the world are taken to be imperfect substitutes.
The primary factors of production have been classified into
four types: On one hand, there are land and capital, and on the
other there is labor, which again is subdivided into High Skilled
and Low Skilled workers . In line with our earlier discussion,
High Skilled workers are assumed to be mobile between both re-
gions (though not internationally) and immobile between sectors
(i.e. skills are sector-specific). This means, essentially, that
High Skilled workers in each sector receive the same wage in both
regions, although that wage may, and generally will, differ be-
The German Statistisches Bundesamt (Fachserie 16, Reihen 2.1,
2.2) separates blue collar workers into three categories and
white collar workers into four categories on a declining scale
based on occupational qualifications and responsibilities.
This ordering is also reflected in the wage and salary struc-
ture. In our model, Low Skilled labor represents an aggregate
of the last two categories of both blue and white collar wor-
kers, while High Skilled labor represents the rest.- 15 -
tween sectors. Low Skilled workers, in contrast, are mobile be-
tween sectors but regionally immobile. This has the consequence
that all Low Skilled workers in a given region receive a uniform
wage independent of the sector in which they are employed. Land
is assumed to be totally immobile, i.e. fixed both regionally and
sectorally. The mobility characteristics of capital will be dis-
cussed shortly, when we consider different model closures.
The model is written as a set of structural equations which
are linear in all growth rates (another trademark of Johansen-
class models), and these are presented in Appendix B. They were
obtained by logarithmically differentiating an underlying system
of non-linear equations and evaluating the derivatives at an
equilibrium point (provided by the entries in the relevant in-
put-output table). For a detailed discussion of these deriva-
tions, the reader is best referred to Dixon et al. (1982), as.a
full elaboration here would lead us too far astray. The system of
equations can be divided into six groups:
(i) Equations (l)-(5) describe the final demands for commodities
(both imported and domestically produced) by households, firms,
14 government, and export demand . With respect to the last of
these, it is assumed that German producers face a downward slop-
ing demand curve for their exports. On the import side, however,
"small-country" assumptions prevail, so that Germany faces an
exogenously given vector of imported goods prices.
14
These equations were derived using the following postulates:
- Households choose consumption to maximize an additive nested
utility function subject to an aggregate budget constraint.
The nests of commodity categories involve CES functions
describing the substitution possibilities between domestic
and imported sources of each category. Leisure is not con-
sidered here as a choice variable.
- Investment spending is modelled (somewhat rudimentarily) by
postulating a declining marginal product of capital schedule
in each industry. Total real investment is set exogenously,
and is allocated across industries in such a way as to
equate expected rates of return.
- Government expenditures fall entirely on the domestic non-
traded commodity.- 16 -
(ii) Equations (6)-(9) describe the industry demands for primary
factors and intermediate inputs
(iii) The pricing equations (10)-(13) are obtained by setting
pure profits from all activities to zero. I.e., perfectly
competitive conditions are assumed to prevail.
(iv) Market clearing equations for primary factors and commodi-
ties are specified in (14)-(17).
(v) Balance of trade and government budget equations are given by
(18)-(24). Since the financial sector is ignored in this model,
money or bond finance of government activities are not consi-
dered. The government must finance its expenditures entirely
through taxes, direct and indirect.
(vi) Eqs. (25)-(43) are miscellaneous definitional equations
which, for example, describe aggregate output, various employment
measures, aggregate wages and the consumer price index.
Perhaps we should repeat that all variables are expressed in the
form of percentage changes rather than in absolute levels or
changes. Due to its linear structure, this system can be solved
by simple matrix methods. A highly attractive feature, from a
computational viewpoint, is the flexibility with which endogenous
variables can be interchangeably specified to conduct various
comparative statics experiments.
Underlying these equations is the assumption that producers
minimize costs subject to a nested, three-tier, CRS production
function. At the highest tier, a Leontief technology is assum-
ed, with fixed proportions between intermediate inputs and an
aggregate of primary factors. At the second tier, CES func-
tions describe the substitution prospects between (a) domestic
and foreign produced intermediate inputs, and (b) between the
three primary factors (capital, land and aggregate labor). At
the third tier, CES functions describe the substitution pro-
spects between Low Skilled and High Skilled Labor.- 17 -
In the experiments performed in the following section, we
consider two model closures, denoted as the short-run and the
medium-run solutions. These are distinguished only by the as-
sumption that physical capital is both sectorally and regionally
immobile in the short-run, and totally mobile (sectorally and
regionally, but not internationally) in the medium-run. This
means that in the short-run sectoral capital stocks are exoge-
nously fixed, while their rates of return are determined endo-
genously. In the medium-run, on the other hand, the sectoral and
regional capital stocks are endogeously determined subject to the
condition of equal rates of return everywhere in the domestic
economy. We reserve the term "Long-run" to cover the situation
(not considered in this paper) where both types of labor become
perfect substitutes; e.g., where they are totally mobile region-
ally, sectorally and occupationally. Admittedly, it remains a
debatable point whether capital takes longer to reallocate than
it takes to retrain skilled workers or to regionally relocate
unskilled workers.
Finally, there are several items that have been placed on
the list of exogenous variables in both model closures which
deserve attention and perhaps some justification:
(i) The balance of trade is assumed always in equilibrium, while
the exchange rate is determined endogenously. That necessarily
implies that the capital account of the balance of payments is
always in equilibrium. This assumption is motivated by two prac-
tical considerations: First is the fact that we have not expli-
citly incorporated a financial sector, including a service
account, in our model. Secondly, our analytic focus revolves more
around the relative distribution of capital across domestic sec-
tors in response to various exogenous events rather than on the
absolute amounts involved. The consequence of this assumption is
that all factors impinging on the wealth position of domestic
residents are captured internally, rather than becoming in part
reflected in the asset-liability positions vis-d-vis foreigners.- 18 -
(ii) The total capital stock of the economy is held constant in
both the short- and medium-run. In the short-run, this is con-
sistent with the previous assumption of sectoral and regional
capital immobility. In the medium-run, this constraint serves to
bring out more clearly the capital-redistribution effects across
regions and sectors of various policies.
(iii) The consumer price index is held constant. Our model fo-
cuses entirely on the real sector with money regarded simply as a
"veil" along traditional classical lines. This means that all
real variables depend only on relative prices, leaving us to
choose a numeraire for the system to determine the absolute price
level. Our choice of a constant CPI is motivated by the German
authorities' postwar emphasis on maintaining stable prices; some-
thing fairly clearly reflected in international inflation rate
comparisons.
(iv) Low Skilled workers are assumed to be in abundant supply and
largely unionized, so that their nominal wages are fixed exoge-
nously, leaving LS employment to be determined by demand. Alter-
natively, the supply of High Skilled workers in each sector is
assumed fixed, while their wages adjust freely to clear all HS
labor markets.
This completes our specification of the model, highlighting
the essential features. Next, we turn to the simulation results.
V. The Impact of and Solutions to the Steel Crisis
a) The effects of declining world steel prices.
We have argued in Section II that the current difficulties
faced by German steelmakers are primarily attributable to the
emergence of low cost steel suppliers in the newly industrialized
countries, along with Japan's competitive lead in steelmaking,
coupled with the protective measures taken by other developed
nations to prevent any substantial declines in their domestic- 19 -
steelmaking capacity. Both factors have led to an oversupply of
steel in world markets, placing downward pressure on world steel
prices. To simulate the effects of such a price decline in our
model, we simultaneously reduce the price of imported iron and
steel by 10% and shift down by 10% the export demand schedule for
German iron and steel. (Referring to the model in Appendix B,
this corresponds to an exogenous 10% reduction in the variables
p. 2 and f... , where i denotes iron and steel) . The short-run and
medium-run effects of this exogenous "shock" on our domestic
economy are summarized in Table 1.
First of all, we notice that the world steel price decline
affects sectoral outputs uniformly across both regions, leading
to a contraction in some sectors and to an expansion in others.
Not surprisingly, the largest percentage decline in output is
registered by the domestic iron and steel industry (row 4). As
for the other sectors, there are two opposing effects: To the
extent that industries depend on steel as an intermediate input,
they will benefit from the cost reduction due to lower steel
prices. However, to the extent that an industry is linked to the
iron and steel sector as a supplier of intermediate inputs, such
as the coal industry, it will experience a decline in demand for
its products. Whether an industry expands or contracts, then
primarily depends, of course, on which of the two linkages is
predominant.
Although the sectoral impact is the same in both regions,
the overall regional impact will not be the same simply because
the industrial sectors are represented in different proportions
in both regions. This is clearly reflected in the effects on
regional LS employment (row 12). In Region I, where iron and
steel (and coal) are primarily concentrated, LS employment de-
clines, while in Region II, the cost reduction effect of lower
steel prices appears to predominate, thereby stimulating economic
activity and leading to increased LS employment. This result
obtains in the short-run as well as in the medium-run. In com-
parison to the regional employment effects, the effects on total
LS employment over both regions (row 11) are fairly small in the- 20 -
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short-run (-0.16%) and negligible in the medium-run (-0.04%).
This result illustrates our statement earlier, that the unem-
ployment problem arising from increased steel import penetration
is a regional, not a national problem. Only the LS workers in
Region I have an incentive to seek government protection in re-
sponse to these developments, not those in Region II.
As would be expected, the effects of falling steel prices
are quite strong on the sector-specific factors in the steel
industry, making for an equally strong incentive for these fac-
tors to demand protection. The negative effect on real wages of
HS Labor in the steel sector is considerable, -25.7% and -23.3%
in the short- and medium-run respectively, while the aggregate HS
real wage only registers a marginal response (row 14). Similarly,
the short-run impact on the rate of return to capital in iron and
steel is -75.1%. (The capital rates of return in the other sec-
tors, though not listed separately, follow in the same direction
as changes in sectoral outputs). If the adjustment process fol-
lowing the price decline were left unimpeded, then by the me-
dium-run the iron and steel sector would experience a capital
outflow of 22.6%, to be distributed among the other sectors. This
capital outflow would raise the return to capital remaining in
the steel sector almost back to the pre-price shock level. (Since
the other sectors have experienced a net inflow of capital the
economy-wide rate of return will be somewhat lower, -0.15%).
The effects on the other macroeconomic variables are compa-
ratively small. In the short-run, there occurs a decline in ag-
gregate output, -0.15%, but by the time all adjustments have
taken place, aggregate output recovers to approximately the same
level as before the price shock (0.01%). However, the exchange
rate (DM/foreign currency) depreciates somewhat in the medium-run
(0.49%), resulting in a slight deterioration of the overall terms
of trade. This result would appear to indicate that consumers in
general have no particularly strong incentive to pressure the
government into taking offsetting actions.- 22 -
Finally, we note that the reduced competitive position of
the domestic iron and steel industry in world markets is re-
flected primarily by reduced exports in the short-run, followed
by increased import penetration in the medium-run (rows 23 and
24). In part, the lagged import response reflects the fact that
the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestically
produced commodities increases over time.
b) The effects of subsidizing steel production.
As we have observed earlier, the German government responded
to the adverse developments emanating from the iron and steel
sector by granting additional subsidies to that industry. The
effects of such a sectoral measure are simulated in our model by
reducing the production tax rate (u.. in Appendix B) , or eguiva-
j *
lently, by raising the production subsidy rate, applicable to the
iron and steel sector in both regions.
From the preceding experiment we found that the three groups
most strongly affected by the fall in world steel prices, and
therefore the most likely to demand some form of government in-
tervention, were HS workers in Iron and Steel, owners of capital
in Iron and Steel, and LS workers in Region I. Of these three,
however, the most likely to elicit a protective response from the
government is thought to be LS labor. That was the conclusion,
reviewed earlier, that emerged from numerous studies investigat-
ing the determinants of German protective measures. Accordingly,
we shall regard the level of LS employment in Region I as a tar-
get variable in the subsequent experiments. For convenience, it
is assumed that the objective of the subsidy program is to raise
LS employment in Region I by 1.1%, i.e., by the same absolute
amount that this variable falls in the preceding medium-run expe-
riment on account of lower steel prices. Before examining the
results of this policy experiment, let us restate briefly for
later reference the two main conditions under which the subsidies
where granted, in agreement with the Code set by the EC
Commission: These are that (a) the subsidies be only intended as
a temporary adjustment aid measure, not to be renewed after 1985,- 23 -
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and that (b) they not prevent the capacity cuts required to make
the industry competitive in the free market.
From Table 2 we observe that while a reduction in iron and
steel production tax rates will be effective in raising LS em-
ployment in Region I, they also have the effect that more resour-
ces become absorbed into the iron and steel sector. Focusing on
the medium-run effects, LS employment in Iron and Steel rises by
11.3% and the capital stock rises by 11.6%. (High Skilled Labor
in the Steel sector remains constant by assumption). When these
figures are viewed in conjunction with the relevant figures in
Table 1, -23.3% and -22.6% respectively, the net reduction of
capacity in the steel sector would only be about one half of the
amount that would be warranted under free market conditions. This
would mean, in other words, that the second condition under which
the subsidies were granted would be violated, or rather, would be
incompatible with the objective of maintaining LS employment in
Region I unchanged. Furthermore, this violation is not immediate-
ly obvious, since we do observe from these joint simulations that
some capacity cuts in iron and steel (-11.0%) would take place.
The problem facing the policymakers granting the subsidies, how-
ever, resides in not knowing beforehand what the appropriate
amount to cut is without actually allowing the free market to
prevail.
We now turn to the other conditional element contained in
the subsidy package, namely that they are to be phased out after
a few years. In row 27 are given the endogenously determined
absolute percentage changes in production taxes that would be
consistent with a target increase of 1.1% in LS employment in
Region I. What is most remarkable about these figures is that
they hardly differ in the short- and medium-runs (-2.14% versus
-2.11%). That would mean that if the production subsidy rate were
to be decreased by any substantial amount after some time, the
government would no longer be able to meet its LS employment
target in Region I. An eventual unilateral reduction in Iron and
Steel subsidies would therefore have the consequence that the- 25 -
level of LS employment in Region I would decline commensurately,
possibly restimulating demands for continued protection.
For illustrative purposes, let us compute the absolute an-
nual value of required subsidies in the short- and medium-run.
Using 1978 as the basis year, the total output value in the Ger-
man iron and steel sector amounted to, approximately, 123 billion
DM. In the short-run, following the 10% steel price decline and
the adoption of subsidies, a net decline of sectoral output takes
place of about 4.2%, leaving a value of 118 billion DM as the
subsidy base. Applying the short-run subsidy rate of 2.14%, would
yield an annual subsidy bill of roughly 2.5 billion DM. Using the
respective figures calculated from the medium-run experiments,
would yield an annual subsidy bill of 2.4 billion DM; barely
lower.
We may further observe in Table 2 that the production tax
reductions have an overall expansionary effect on the economy,
with equal regional impacts in all sectors. This is reflected
also in the increase of national LS employment and in aggregate
output (rows 11 and 20). Only the non-tradeables sector contracts
in the medium-run. This exception to the rule can be traced back
to the government budget constraint: With less tax revenue the
government has less to spend on non-tradeables, the only commo-
dity demanded by the government. This development becomes even
more evident (in rows 18 and 19) by the switch in final demands
away from public towards private consumption.
However, the subsidies to the iron and steel sector were not
granted with the objective of stimulating aggregate economic
activity. In fact, this by-product effect may turn out to be a
disadvantage: Recall from the preceding experiment that falling
world steel prices stimulate economic activity in Region II,
while leaving aggregate output and national LS employment ap-
proximately unchanged in the medium-run. By granting steel sub-
sidies to combat unemployment in Region I, however, unnecessary
expansionary fuel is provided at the same time to Region II. If
an aggregate expansion over both regions were desired, then the- 26 -
more economical measure would be to grant subsidies to all sec-
tors in both regions. Per unit of aggregate output or national LS
employment increase, such a policy would involve a smaller over-
all subsidy bill and less structural distortions than do subsi-
dies granted exclusively to steel.
Lower production taxes generally bring about an efficiency
gain in terms of aggregate production, which is independent of
the adverse structural effects brought about by lowering taxes in
just one sector. However, that production gain does not necess-
arily represent a social improvement, for that would depend on
the valuation of foregone public goods previously financed with
those taxes; on whether market prices are used or social shadow
prices. In order to circumvent this valuation problem, a separate
experiment was conducted (not fully elaborated here), where lower
steel production taxes are simultaneously offset by commensurate-
ly higher production taxes in all other sectors to keep total
real government revenues constant. Under that restriction, it
turns out that a target increase in LS employment in Region I by
1.1% is associated with a decline in aggregate output of
c) The effects of regional wage subsidies.
An important insight obtained from the traditional litera-
ture on optimal government intervention is that policy measures
should be applied at the closest possible point to the objective
sought, so that other unintended effects on the rest of the eco-
nomy are kept to a minimum. (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963; Cor-
den, 1974; Johnson, 1965). In different words, any distortions
arising on account of,say, the existence of externalities or
We have here, in effect, a two-instruments, two-targets prob-
lem. A proportional increase of production tax rates in all
regions and sectors, other than the steel sector, by 10% has
the effect that LS employment in Region I and aggregate output
fall by 1.23% and .52% respectively, while real government
expenditures rise by 2.54%. Using these three figures along
with the respective figures from Table 2 (resulting from lower
production taxes in steel alone), and recalling the system's
linear structure, yields the output figure stated in the text.- 27 -
public goods are best dealt with through measures directly ap-
plied to the source of the distortion in order to avoid new
by-product distortions (or upsetting marginal conditions) else-
where in the economy. By this principle alone, the previously
examined sectoral subsidies would clearly be suboptimal as a
means of attaining the objectives sought. According to our story,
it is not the conservation of the iron and steel industry, per
se, which is desired by policymakers, but rather the preservation
of jobs for workers classified as Low Skilled in the region where
the iron and steel industry happens to be concentrated. A re-
gionally focused policy aimed at the labor market would therefore
be a more direct route toward meeting that objective, than would
a sectoral policy aimed at the steel industry on a national lev-
el.
As was already stated in the introduction, regional wage
subsidies are not the first-best solution to the economic problem
arising from lowered steel prices. They have the by-product ef-
fect of tying down factor resources in regionally less advan-
tageous production sites and also of distorting the factor in-
tensity choice by firms. Both are likely to have deleterious
growth effects in the long-run. The first-best measure, if feas-
ible, would be to implement measures which facilitate or en-
courage the interregional mobility of LS workers, since that is
precisely the source of friction in this model from which the
regional LS unemployment problem of relevance to government poli-
cymakers arises. However, we have, in section III also pointed
toward a disinclination on the part of politicians to offer po-
licies which would involve a substantial relocation of consti-
tuents into other regions, i.e., voting districts. For that
reason we confine our present attention to regional wage sub-
sidies, as a second-best measure.
Table 3 presents the effects in our model of.an aggregate
wage subsidy rate increase paid to producers and uniformly
applied across all sectors in Region I (ws. . in appendix B,
i, j , x,
for j referring to all 10 sectors and i referring only to Region
I). Following the same procedure as in the preceding experiment,- 28 -
we raise these wage subsidies by enough to yield a 1.1% increase
in Region I, LS Labor employment, using first the short-run
closure and then the medium-run closure.
We observe that the regional wage subsidies, by reducing net
labor costs to producers in Region I, stimulate overall economic
activity in that region, while in general causing economic acti-
vity in Region II to contract. Mobile factor resources are drawn
from Region II to be absorbed in Region I (HS Labor in the short-
run, inclusive capital in the medium-run). Isolating the immobile
factor, LS labor (row 12), we find that the increased employment
in Region I is matched by reduced employment in Region II, in a
proportion that almost precisely offsets the regional employment
impact of falling steel prices, shown in Table 1. Furthermore,
the macroeconomic impact of these wage subsidies is only slight
in the short-run, and negligible in the medium-run; not involv-
ing, for example, the substantial shifts in private versus public
expenditures observed under the iron and steel subsidy program.
Thus unintended effects in the rest of the economy are minimal.
The most important consequence of this hypothetical regional
wage subsidy program is that it does not seriously distort the
sectoral production structure of the economy, and therefore does
not impede the readjustment processes warranted by changing world
economic conditions. That is quite in contrast to the preceding
steel subsidy simulation, which creates jobs in Region I mainly
by retaining resources in an already ailing industry threatened
by further foreign competition. Viewing the medium-run experiment
in Table 3 in conjunction with the Table 1 experiment, we see
(from rows 13 and 17) that the wage subsidies do not prevent the
capacity cuts in the iron and steel industry that would take
place in a free market without any intervention at all. In other
words, under the regional wage subsidy program, the objective of
maintaining LS employment constant would be compatible with the
condition that capacity cuts in the domestic iron and steel in-
dustry be made by the proper amount in view of the lowered steel
prices abroad. Note also, by comparing row 24 in Table 1 and 3,- 29 -
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that this wage subsidy policy does not deprive domestic indus-
tries and consumers of the benefits from cheaper foreign steel.
Let us finally turn to the direct costs of the wage subsidy
program. In row 27 of Table 3 we have listed the absolute wage
subsidy percentage rates required to bring about a level of LS
employment in Region I that is 1.1% higher than it would other-
wise be. In the short-run, this rate is 0.33%, while in the me-
dium-run, after all the adjustments have taken place, this figure
dwindles to a trifling 0.02%. Interesting to note that this wage
subsidy program is also more compatible with the intention of
phasing out subsidies over time.
To continue with the illustration begun with the previous
experiment, we can compute the annual subsidy bill under this
program in the short- and medium-runs. In 1978, the total wage
bill paid in all sectors in Region I (North Rhine-Westfalia and
the Saarland) amounted to roughly 218 billion DM. With that as
the base, the short-run subsidy bill would amount to 719 million
DM per annum (multiplying the base times a rate of 0.33%), while
in the medium-run this bill would drop to 44 million DM per annum
(using the subsidy rate of 0.02%); considerably lower
VI. Summary and Conclusions
It could be argued, as many people have, that the compe-
titive strength of the German iron and steel industry is still
such that, in a free trade world without public interference, it
would have little difficulty in defending its current share in
world markets. Though perhaps not the most efficient producer in
absolute terms, Germany would still rank high enough on the in-
Of course, if subsidies are stopped entirely, the economy
would revert to the position, illustrated in Table 1, result-
ing in the medium-run after the steel price shock. So long as
the barriers to regional mobility as modeled here persist,
some intervention is necessary to attain certain employment
objectives; the question is, however, at what cost.- 31 -
ternational ladder of comparative advantage in steelmaking to
guarantee the survival of its steel industry. However, it would
be a costly mistake to act on the basis of this "natural" com-
parative advantage by propping up a domestic steel industry when
the world environment is not freely competitive and other nations
are willing to give away goods in the form of subsidized steel.
That is a basic lesson of trade theory, and it appears to have
been accepted by German policymakers insofar as they do not
attach any special significance to the existence of a domestic
steel industry, in contrast to any other industry. They have,
nonetheless, felt compelled to grant subsidies to steel on the
grounds (some might say pretext) that the transitional adjustment
costs associated with a sudden decline of the industry would be
too great to bear if left unattended. A steel program was there-
fore conceived with the intention of facilitating the adaptation
process away from steel production, without preventing the re-
quired structural readjustments from taking place. That intention
was made explicit by provisions in the program that set a dead-
line, after which subsidies are to be discontinued, and that link
aid to capacity reductions by sufficient amounts to leave the
industry in a competitive position again.
Evidence on industry protection patterns in Germany has
indicated that the greatest beneficiaries of past protective
policies have been the unskilled workers, which are characterized
by a high degree of regional immobility. Using a model embodying
some key structural characteristics of the West German economy,
we have shown that a decline in world steel prices will result in
pockets of unskilled labor unemployment in the regions where the
iron and steel industry is heavily concentrated. These observa-
tions have led to our conjecture that the primary purpose behind
the steel subsidy program was to alleviate the problem of re-
gional unskilled labor employment.
What the comparative statics experiments in this essay have
shown is that the objective of maintaining stable levels of un-
skilled labor employment by way of steel-sector subsidies is
incompatible with the two central provisions of the steel pro-- 32 -
gram. They have the effect that additional resources become ab-
sorbed into the iron and steel sector, above the amount that
would result in the absence of any intervention, thereby impeding
the structural adjustments warranted on account of lower world
steel prices. Also, the subsidy bill needed to generate a given
amount of regional employment does not become substantially less
over time. As a second-best alternative, it was shown that a
regionally focused program of wage subsidies could achieve the
same regional employment objective without obstructing the struc-
tural readjustment process as much as sectoral subsidies, and
would also cost substantially less in terms of the total amount
transferred, particularly in the medium-run . The fundamental
principle underlying both programs is the same: They both raise
employment in a given region by attracting more jobs into (or
raising activity levels in) that region. Regional wage subsidies,
however, lead to a sectorally balanced increase in industrial
activity, while the sectoral measure primarily generates more
jobs in the iron and steel sector; jobs which will again become
threatened by further declines in world steel prices. It should
be repeated, however, that both policies are dominated by an
eocnomically feasible first-best policy aimed at reducing the
mobility costs of unskilled labor, even though this may be found
politically infeasible.
These results lead to the conclusion that a unilateral re-
duction in domestic subsidies granted to the steel industry would
result in a severe decline in unskilled labor employment in the
regions with high steel concentration. That would in turn prompt
demands for renewed protection. What could prevent this from
happening is if other countries simultaneously eliminated their
subsidies to steel. We recall that this is the explicit objective
stated in the guidelines negotiated through the EC Commission. If
18
One step in this direction was taken by the EC Commission in
January 1984, when it decided to allocate 0.5 billion DM (Ger-
many is to receive 90 million DM) from its Regional Fund to-
ward creating alternative jobs in the regions heavily af-
flicted by the depressed steel industry. Die Welt, 5 June
1984.- 33 -
those guidelines are obeyed, and if it is true, as was speculated
at the outset, that Germany has a competitive advantage in steel-
making over most of its European neighbors, then a multilateral
reduction in subsidies would have the effect that German steel
production would largely displace the production of other EC
members. These other member countries would then, however, be
faced with the same structural adjustment problems which led to
their initial adoption of subsidy measures. Unless the political
power configurations in those countries have changed in the mean-
time, there is a good chance, therefore, that the previous steel
subsidy programs will become reinstated. German policymakers
would then be faced with the choice of doing the same or follow-
ing a different course. Our results suggest a preferable alterna-
tive course.- 34 -
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The following table describes the aggregation scheme by which
the 58 industries of the input-output table provided by the
German Statistisches Bundesamt were converted into the 10 sec-
tors used in our model. The latest available figures for the
German input-output table are for the year 1978 (published in
19 83).The three industrial categories which comprise our iron
and steel sector are raw iron and steel (16), cast iron and
other foundry products (18), and drawn and rolled steel products
(19). Non-ferrous metals and products thereof (17) were aggre-
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Household demands for commodities
by source
Household demands for commodities
undifferentiated by source
Regional household demands for
commodities




Government demands by region
Export demands
Demands for intermediate inputs
Activity level undifferentiated
by region
Regional demands for intermediate
inputs of non-traded good h
Demands for aggregate labor
fixed capital, and land
Demands for aggregate labor
fixed capital, and land
Wages by industry and by region
1 A general guide to the system of notation:
In the equations, all variables are stated in percentage changes and are denoted by lower case letters. The expression,
x'f* . is used to denote the percentage change in the comncdityifran source s demanded by industry j for purpose a.
Possible sources are domestic production (s = 1) and imports (s = 2). Ihe letter,a,refers to five possible use catego-
ries ( 1 = current production, 2 = capital creation, 3 = household consumption, 4 = assets, 5 = government demands).
The range of letters i and j is determined by the number of sectors in the economy, ihe same system of
notation applies to shares which are denoted by upper case letters, e.g. S;. . . or to parameters which are denoted by
(a) Us)]
Greek letters, e.g. o'. . Similarly, the index v refers to primary factors (1 = aggregate labour, 2 = fixed capital,
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- in capital creation
- in inporting
- in exporting
Supply equals demand for
- domestically produced tradable
comnodities
- non-traded goods
- Low Skilled labor by region
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Rates of return to capital
Industry investment by region
Aggregate investment (nominal)
General price of goods to households
Consumer price index





Relationship between real consumption
and real investment
Aggregate employment by qualification
Real wages by region for icw
Skilled labor








Aggregate real wage for High Skilled
labor



















































National household demands for domestic and imported goods
National household demands undifferentiated by source
Regional household demands undifferentiated by source
Regional household demand for non-traded good h
Price of good i from source s
Regional price of non-traded good h
Number of households in region 8.
Regional aggregate nominal household expenditure
National demands by industry j for domestic and imported good i for capital creation
National capital creation by using industry
Regional capital creation by using industry
Other (mainly government) demand for non-traded good
Real government expenditure
Nominal government expenditure
F.o.b- foreign currency export prices
Export demands for good i
Export demand shift variable
National demands for domestic and imported inputs for current production
National industry outputs
Industry outputs of traded goods by region
Regional output of non-traded good
Regional demands for non-traded inputs for current production
Regional industry demands for primary factors (aggregate labor, fixed capital, land)
Rental prices of primary factors in each regional industry
Regional industry demands for labor by occupation























































Price of High Skilled labor by industry
One plus ad valorem rates of production taxes net of subsidies by regions and industries
Costs of units of capital
C.i.f. foreign currency prices for imports
One plus the ad valorem rates of protection on imports
Exchange rate (DM/$ US)
One plus ad valorem rates of export subsidies
Regional employment by occupation
Sectoral employment of occupation
Capital stocks by industry and region
Land by industry and region
Foreign currency value of exports
Foreign currency value of imports
Commodity import volumes
Total indirect tax income
Rates of return to capital by industry and region




Investment goods price index
Real household expenditure
Nominal household expenditure

























Balance of trade, 10 DM
Aggregate capital stock
Real domestic absorption
Real wages for Low Skilled labor by region
Real wages for High Skilled labor by industry
Skift term in the rate of return to capital
Wage subsidies by industry and by region
Aggregate net output
Aggregate real wage for High Skilled labor.
Total number of variables: 12g + 2dg + 10d + 4gh + 7h + 15dh + 22
h = 10, g = 9, d = 2Coefficients of the German Model
Values for coefficients denoted 10 were calculated from the data drawn from the 1978 input-output

















CES import-domestic ("Armington") substitution elasticities for good i in household
consumption (o^
3*) , demand for intermediate inputs for current production of good j
(o!')|, as inputs to capital creation in industry j (o|2). The elasticities are only
assumed to differ with respect to industries, but not to uses. Econometric: see U. Lach-
ler, 1984.
Substitution elasticities among primary factors (v=1 : aggregate labor; v=2 : capital;
v=3 : land), assumed to 1 .0 thus yielding a Cobb-Douglas specification of the CES produc-
tion function; and substitution elasticities between the two types of labor, assumed to
1.0 (see Leo Pusse, 1980). Casual experiments showed no marked sensitivity of the results
to reasonable variations in these parameters.
Expenditure (ei) , own price (n^w i = k) and cross price (nlk, i i k) elasticities.
Since the assumed underlying household behaviour is reflectea by the linear expendi-
ture system, the matrix of uncompensated own price and cross price elasticities can
be generated via the Frisch formula, using expenditure elasticities, budget shares
(a.) and the Frisch parameter (w)
n, . = - e. a. (1 + —1) i t j
i] i j w
Estimates based on Lluch, Powell, Williams (1977),
Reciprocal of the foreign demand elasticities for German exports of commodity i. Esti-
mates based on comparable results in L. Alan Winters (1981).
Industry investment parameters. Qj is the ratio of the gross (before depreciation) to
the net (after depreciation) rate of return in industry j. Bj is the reciprocal of the
elasticity of the expected rate of return schedule for industry j times the ratio of
its gross investment to its following year capital stock. Tj is the share of total in-
vestment accounted for by industry j
Z. Schmidt (1982)).
(10.Computed from data.on the capital stock in
Respectively the shares of GDP accounted for by aggregate consumption, investment,
government, export and import demand (10).
Shares of good i from source s (1 = domestic, 2 = imported) in industry j's total
purchases of good i for use as intermediate goods (1) or in capital creation (2).
10.
Share of good i from source s in total household purchases of good i. 10.
Share of primary factor v in total factor payments of sectorj (v=1 : aggregate labor;
v=2 : fixed capital; v=3 : land). 10.
Share of labor of occupation q in industry j's total labour costs. Computed from data
in: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Reihe 2.1 and 2.2.
Production cost shares in industry j of intermediate inputs of commodity of source s,
labor of qualification q, fixed capital and land. 10.
Share of non-traded intermediate inputs and of production taxes (subsidies) in in-























Cost share of good i from source s in industry j's total purchases of good i for
input to capital creation. 10.
Respectively the share of the total sales of domestic good i absorbed by industry j
for intermediate inputs for current production (1) and for capital creation(2),
by households (3) and export demands (4). Government demand consists of the non-traded
good only. 10. .
Respectively the share of the total output of non-traded good h of region I absorbed
by industry j for intermediate inputs for current production (1), by households (3)
and government (5). Investment demand of the non-traded good is negligible. 10.
Shares of total imports of good i accounted for by industry j for inputs into current
production (1) and capital creation (2), and by households (3). Re-exporting has been
neglected. 10.
Share of sector j in regional employment of occupation q. Source as for S-| g j -
Share of region I in sectoral employment of occupation q. Source as above.
Respectively, regional shares in national sectoral output and national sectoral ca-
pital creation, household demand for good i, and government expenditures (expendi-
ture on good h by governments). Statistical Yearbooks (Federal and Lander Statistical
Offices); Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 4, Reihe 4.2.2, 1978.
Modified cost chare of primary factor v in total primary factor costs in industry i.
Equals the unmodified cost shares due to parameter choice in the production function.
Share of total foreign currency cost accounted for by imported good i. 10.
Share of total foreign currency export earnings accounted for by exported good i. 10.
Aggregate foreign currency value of imports. 10.
Aggregate foreign currency value of imports. 10.
Share of indirect taxes (net of subsidies) in financing government expenditure. 10.'hi
Respectively the shares in net indirect tax income represented by import tariffs on
good i, export subsidies for product i, production taxes in sector j ( j = 1 , . . . ,g )





Respectively the ratios of total values of product i imports (c.i.f.), of product i
exports (f.o.b.), of production in sector j (j = 1,...,h) to total net indirect tax
revenue. 10.
<¥
Share of consumers' expenditure on good i from source s (W£s') and of non-traded
good h in region I (W.Q)) in total consumers' expenditure. 10.
-21 Share of High Skilled labor in total regional labor income. Source as for S1 „
Share of High Skilled labor in total regional employment. Source as above.
Share of region I in total employment of occupational labor of type q. Source as above.
Share of industry j in total capital stock of region 1. J. Schmidt (1982), and as for
Share of region i, in national capital stock. Source as above.
Share of industry j in total net output. 10.
Share of industry j in total wages for High Skilled labor. Source as for S. ..